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SAVINGS BANK DEPOSITS AS IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS.
The important case of In'Re Totten, 7x N. E. 748, recently
decided in the Court of Appeals of New York, marks a new
departure of that court as regards the incidents of trusts
created by deposits "in trust" for some designated beneficiary.
In the summary of its decision the Court says: "A deposit in
a savings bank by one person of his own money in his own
name as trustee for another, standing alone, does not establish
an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is
a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor
dies, or until he completes the gift in his lifetime by some
unequivocal act or declaration, such as delivery of the pass
book, -or notice to the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies
before the beneficiary without revocation or some decisive act
or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an
absolute trust was created as to the balance remaining on
deposit at the time of the death of the depositor." In this case
the Court held that the removal of the fund and the application
of it to the depositor's own use amounted to a revocation. The
leading New York case hitherto has been Martin v. Funk, 75 N.
Y. z34, decided in 1878, which held that such a deposit, though
for distant relatives of the depositor who knew nothing of the
trust until after the depositor's death, created an irrevocable
trust. Though somewhat modified by more recent decisions,
the authority of that case has not hitherto been disputed. The
decision in Re Totten gives a thorough review of all the New
York cases.
The rule laid down in Martin v. Funk seems, in so far as the
matter has been adjudicated, to be the law in Connecticut,
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Pennsylvania and New Jersey. In Minor v. Rogers, 40 Conn.
5 12, the deposit was held a trust and the beneficiary permitted
to follow the funds in the hands of the executors, where the
depositor had drawn out all the money and applied it to his
own purposes. But in many of the states the rule adopted in
Massachusetts in Brabrook v. Boston Five Cent Savings Bank, 104
Mass. 228, has been followed, in which the reasoning is practi-
cally that now adopted by the New York Court of Appeals.
The rule is there laid down that whether the deposit is or is not
a trust depends upon the intention of the depositor. Where
the fact of the deposit is known to the beneficiary it is held to
be strong evidence to establish the existence of a trust.
McCarthy v. Provident Say. Inst., 159 Mass. 527; Blasdel v. Locke,
52 N. H. 238. But deposits "in trust" for some named bene-
ficiary are usually made for the purpose of evading the almost
universal by-law forbidding more than a specified amount to be
deposited in the name of one person. Such an intention the
courts hold incompatible with an intention to create a trust,
and where the beneficiary is neither party nor privy to the
deposit are inclined to deny the existence of a trust. Brabrook
v. Say. Bk., supra; Gardner v. Merritt, 32 Md. 78; Kilpin *v.
.ilpin, i Myl. and K. 533. In all jurisdictions parol evidence is
admissible to establish the depositor's real intention. Northrop
v. Hate, 72 Me. 275; Ray v. Simmons, ii R. I. 266; Gerrish v.
New Bedford, 128 Mass. 159.
While the decision in Re Totten is doubtless based upon busi-
ness convenience, that. case and those following the Massa-
chusetts decisions would seem to be in disregard of many well-
established principles of the law of trusts, with which the cases
adhering to the strict rule would seem more strictly in accord.
It seems a well-settled principle that a person may by an
unequivocal declaration that he so holds, constitute himself
trustee of any property which he possesses. Kekewich v.
Manning, i D. M. and G. 176; Exparte Pye, x8 Ves. Jun. 140.
The question in each case would seem to be, has or has not the
depositor created himself a trustee. If he has, the ordinary
incidents of a trust attach. The mere fact that he retains the
pass book does not affect his relationship, for, as was said in
Martin v. Funk, whatever control he may retain is exercised as
trustee, and the right to exercise it is not necessarily incon-
sistent with the existence of a trust. According to the great
weight of authority when a trust has attached it is irrevocable
in the absence of an express power of revocation or of circum-
stances indicating the retention of such a power. Perry on
Trusts, See. 104. And this is the law in New York, Massa-
chusetts and New Hampshire. It would seem, too, that where
the depositor has so deposited money for the purpose of evading
some provision of the law, he ought not be permitted to profit
by that fact, since equity will always presume an intention to
comply with the law where it must decide between two incon-
sistent acts.
COMMENT.
TO WHAT EXTENT A LEGISLATURE MAY DELEGATE ITS POWERS TO
A BOARD OR COMMISSION.
The Supreme Court of Oregon. in the case of State v. Briggs,
77 Pac. 750, was recently called upon to decide on the constitu-
tionality of a law prescribing the qualifications for, and regu-
lating the practice of the trade of barber, which was attacked
on the ground that it delegated legislative power to the board
of examiners. The law in substance provides for the appoint-
ment of a board of examiners, defines their powers and
duties, among which are the making of by-laws and the pre-
scribing of the qualifications of a barber, declares that it
shall be utilawful for any person not registered, to practice
the business of a barber, or conduct a barber school, without
the sanction of the board and prescribes the penalty for its vio-
lation. It is conceded in all the decisions involving this point
and by all text writers that more or less of the details neces-
sarily involved in giving the legislative intention the force and
effect of law must be left to the administrative authorities.
The legislature is in session but a short portion of the year; it
cannot legislate for each contingency that may arise, and unless
there is some means provided to determine questions of a quasi-
legislative character, the law, for the most part, must be inop-
erative. Nearly all the opinions upon the point in question
state, in substance, that "the legislature cannot delegate its
power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power
to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law
makes, or intends to make, its own action depend." Thus the
question in all cases is to what extent the legislature may make
the operation of law depend upon facts and circumstances to be
determined by a board appointed for that purpose.
In the case of the State v. Briggs, the giving to the board of
barber examiners the above powers was held not to be a dele-
gation of legislative authority. Let us take up briefly some of
the cases roughly parallel to the above decision, although it is
hardly feasible to classify them in any satisfactory way.
The State of South Carolina authorized the Board of Agri-
culture to determine who should have the right to mine phos-
phate rock from the property of the state, and to license those
whom the board in their discretion thought would work for the
best interests of the state. P. R. Co. v. Hagood, 30 S. C. 519.
The pure food law of Indiana provides that "within ninety
days after its passage the board of health should adopt measures
to facilitate the law's enforcement, and prepare rules regu-
lating minimum standards of foods, define specific adultera-
tions," etc. Isenhour v. State, 157 Ind. 57. Both of these laws
were upheld. The federal court decided that the Act of Con-
gress authorizing the Secretary of War to give notice for the
alteration of bridges that he believed to be unreasonable
obstructions to navigation, and empowering the District
Attorney to prosecute parties refusing to comply with such
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
notice is not unconstitutional, as vesting the Secretary with
legislative power. U. S. v. City of Moline, 82 Fed. 592. In
Massachusetts, the legislature, having the power of determin-
ing the qualifications of officers not otherwise provided for in
the constitution, has the authority to delegate such power to
the civil service commission. Opinion of Justices to House of
Reps., 138 Mass. 6oi.
The legislature has power to confer upon the board of health
of a city the authority to enact and enforce ordinances. Peo. v.
Justice, 7 Hun 214. There are many cases where boards of
health have been given the power to prescribe the qualifications
of a doctor or dentist, etc., and to decide which colleges should
be accredited and which should not. Hiidreth v. Crawford, 65
Iowa 339; Ex parte McNuly, 77 Cal. 164.
Another large class of cases involving the question under
discussion arises from the creation of railroad commissions.
General laws have been passed for the regulation of rates
charged by railroads which delegate to a commission the power
to determine what constitute reasonable rates. Such laws
have uniformly been held constitutional. Tilley v. Ry. Co., 5
Fed. 641; Chi. Ry. Co. v. Dey, 35 Fed. 866; Ry. Co. v. Smith, io
Ga. 694; Peo. v. Harper, 91 Ill. 357. The federal courts place
great weight upon the fact that the general law granting the
board, or commission, power to make rules or regulations,
should also declare the violation of such rules or regulations,
when promulgated, to be a misdemeanor and prescribe the
penalty therefor, instead of giving the board power to declare
a violation of the rules a misdemeanor and prescribe the pen-
alty. Ex-parte Cox, 63 Cal. 21; U. S. v. Breen, 40 Fed. 402;
U. S. v. City of Moline, supra.
Though in the above cases questions of a quasi-legislative
nature have been quite generally delegated to boards, commis-
sions, and executive officers or departments, yet that power is
not without limitations. In Michigan an ordinance which left
it within the discretion of a mayor or police officer to regulate
processions in the streets of a city was declared unconstitutional
"because it leaves the power of permitting or restraining pro-
cessions and their course to an unregulated official discretion,
when the whole matter, if regulated at all, must be by perma-
nent legislation." Matter of Frazee, 63 Mich. 396. Also,
where a law or ordinance delegates to -a board an unregulated
official discretion it is unconstitutional. Cicero Lumber Co. v.
Cicero, 176 Ill. 9.
In the case of O'Neilv. Ins. Co., 166 Penn. St. 72, it was
declared a delegation of legislative authority to direct the
insurance commissioner to draw a standard policy to be used by
all.insurance companies. In the opinion the court gives five
reasons why the act is unconstitutional. First, the act does
not fix the terms and conditions of the policy, the use of which
it commands. Second, it delegates the power to prescribe the
form of the policy and the conditions and restrictions to be
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added to and made part thereof, to a single individual. Third,
the appointee clothed with the power is named only by his
official title. Fourth, the appointee is not required to report to
the legislature; his report is filed in his own office and never
becomes an integral part of the statutes. Fifth, the legislature
had no control over the form when filed, and had no knowledge
of the act they required all companies to follow, and for the
violation of which they prescribed a heavy penalty. The above
decision does not seem to have given so much weight as the
federal courts to the fact that the general law made the viola-
tion of the act a misdemeanor and prescribed a penalty for its
violation.
But two states, other than Oregon, have been found to have
state laws regulating the trade of barber-Missouri and
Nebraska. Each leaves to a board of examiners the determin-
ing of the necessary qualifications of a barber and the granting
of licenses, but in each state the law is more explicit in its
direction of the course to be pursued by the board and in its
limitations upon their power than is the Oregon law. The
Nebraska law went into effect in 1889 and the Missouri law in
1900.
